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"Alternative Facts"

1/24/2017

14 Comments

 
Natalie Ashton
After President Trump’s press secretary Sean Spicer made a series of false claims in his first official statement to the press, high-ranking White House official Kelly Conway defended him by saying that he presented not falsehoods, but rather “alternative facts”. This phrase has been widely criticised, and, I think, rightly so. But some people might also be tempted to connect what Conway said with relativism, and criticise relativism as a result.

​Take this tweet from the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which emphasises the connection between "fact" and "objective reality":

□A fact is a piece of information presented as having objective reality. https://t.co/gCKRZZm23c

— Merriam-Webster (@MerriamWebster) January 22, 2017
It would be easy to conclude from this that those who critically explore the connection between facts and objectivity are guilty of paving the way for people like Conway to say what she said. I think that this would be a mistake.

At their core, relativist theses say that some things (such as values, norms, or facts) are dependent on some other things (like social groups or individuals) in such a way that the first things can only be judged with reference to the second things. So according to one possible kind of relativism it’s not right to say that a particular norm is “correct” (as an absolutist about norms might say), but only that it is “correct according to group x”. It might seem that this kind of view could justify Conway’s point about “alternative facts”. Perhaps she meant that there are facts relative to one group (the Trump administration) and facts relative to another group (the press), and that it’s not proper to judge either of those facts by external standards. So, it’s not right to say that one set of facts obtain and the other don’t; they are both just ‘alternatives’.

I don’t think that this is the right way to interpret Conway, but let’s run with it for now. If this kind of relativism is behind what Conway is saying, then doesn’t this show that relativism is highly problematic? I don’t think so.

We can distinguish different kinds of relativism according to (1) the phenomenon that they relativise, and (2) the variable that they relativise that phenomenon to. The relativism that seems to be implicit in Conway’s thinking relativises facts to the Trump administration.

Let’s take the relativised phenomena first. Versions of relativism which relativise facts are known as metaphysical relativism, and they are less common and more radical than other variants, like epistemic relativism (which relativises the property of justification to some variable) and moral relativism (which relativises moral properties to some variable). So there are plenty of relativist theses that don’t make controversial claims about facts. None of these kinds of relativism are implicated by anything that Conway has said.

What about the variable that the phenomena is relativised to? There are a range of variables that relativists can choose from, but whichever one they pick they must be able to offer an explanation of why it’s legitimate to relativise their chosen phenomena to. In other words, if a metaphysical relativist wanted to justify the kind of assertions that Conway makes, they would need to tell a convincing story about why groups or organisations like the Trump administration are a suitable variable to which to relativise facts. It’s very unclear how such a story would go, and so there’s little reason to think that a metaphysical relativist could, let alone would, defend this kind of view. What this means is that Conway and her “alternative facts” don’t present us with any reason to be suspicious of metaphysical relativism either.

To the extent that Conway is depending a kind of relativism then, she is depending on a very particular and implausible kind of relativism that shouldn’t be thought to have any bearing on the variety of serious relativist views in the literature. But as I said before, I don’t think that it’s right to interpret her as really relying on relativism in the first place. Note that (in the video clip linked above) Conway is happy to criticise some claims as “flat-out false”. Whilst she thinks that it’s a mistake to judge the claims made by Spicer against an independent, objective standard (they aren’t falsehoods but are instead true-relative-to-the-administration) she doesn’t have a problem with judging the claims of the press objectively (she doesn’t think that they are false-relative-to-the-administration and true-relative-to-the-press, but are false simpliciter). Conway dabbles with relativising facts when it suits her purposes, but equally she reveals a commitment to absolutism when that is more convenient. Her behaviour is no more an indictment of relativism than it is of absolutism.
14 Comments
Martin Kusch
1/24/2017 05:12:46 am

Bravo Natalie! -- I just have a brief footnote. I suspect Conway simply meant to say that Todd (i.e. the journalist she was talking to) was referring to one subset of the facts (how the Mall looked like at time t), and she (and Spicer) were referring to another -- "alternative" -- subset of the facts (how the Mall looked like at time t'). Of course, she and Spicer were wrong (indeed very probably lying!) about how the Mall looked at t'. -- I am not sure whether my suggestion is a charitable one. For what is worse (in the eyes of my fellow philosophers): being a liar or being a metaphysical relativist?

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Nick Byrd link
1/24/2017 07:11:43 am

I want to echo Martin's construal of 'alternative' as a "subset of [the data]." On hat construal Conway is talking in ways that are totally normal in science — "In our data, we find that ..., but in so-and-so's data, they find something else. So in the present meta-analysis, we aim to make sense of the discrepancies between datasets."

If this is what Conway has in mind, then we should not blame her for the use of 'alternative facts', but for not treating facts scientifically. Continuing with the science analogy, Conway is blameworthy for not trying to resolve the discrepancies between datasets with a meta-analytical approach. That is, Conway (wrongly) seems satisfied with a demonstrably problematic and incomplet's set of data. We have names for such biased reasoning: motivated reasoning, selection bias, confirmation bias, etc.

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Natalie Ashton link
1/25/2017 07:53:30 am

Thanks Martin, Thanks Nick!

I agree that *if* Conway was referring to a subset of the facts (or data) then your diagnoses are correct. But I don't think I've seen any evidence to that effect. (I guess either way the general point stands: this is not relativism, but faulty reasoning or active deception!)

William Knorpp
1/24/2017 07:05:10 am

First, thanks for creating this blog!

I agree that many people are interpreting Conway's assertion rather uncharitably, though I find myself unable to defend her enthusiasticaly. It's fairly likely that she meant *alternative evidence.* I agree that she's still probably lying or otherwise cheating. But it's rather bad form to make so much out of an infelicitous claim formulated on the spur of the moment. It reminds me a bit of the fuss made over (what turned out to be Rove's(?)) "reality-based community" utterance. I think that was a clearer case: he seems to have meant: *the other side accepts things as they are; we seek to change them.* Making such a fuss is also a bit odd because it's the other (far) end of the political spectrum that more commonly flirts with relativism or nihilism about facts or truth. Conway's end of the spectrum tends to use less complicated tactics like just ignoring inconvenient facts.

As for the more philosophical point (and to use Chris Swoyer's terminology): I agree that the Trump team is not promising as an "independent variable." But, then, it seems to me that one of the major problems for relativism is that it's never made a plausible case for *any* of its preferred independent variables. Or, rather: there always seems to be an unbridgeable gap between the kinds of independent variables that make a view "relativistic" (e.g. culture, belief) and the kinds of dependent variables that make it such (truth, rationality, moral obligation). That's why "relativism"* seems (as I'd put it) to be an attempt to get philosophical blood from a turnip.

* scare quotes because: I think the term 'relativism' and its cognates are flawed, and part of the problem.

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Natalie Ashton link
1/25/2017 08:57:34 am

Hi William, thank you for reading the blog!

As I said in response to the comment above, I don't think I've seen much evidence for the more charitable interpretations of what Conway said - though it's possible that I just haven't tried very hard. I think part of the reason that there has been such an outcry is that Conway's statement seems to be part of a more general attempt by the Trump administration to lie and deceive, and not to do so with specific aims in mind (not much turns on whether it rained or not whilst Trump was giving his speech) but, I fear, in order to create general confusion and weariness so that people stop being able (or even willing) to tell when they are talking rubbish and when they are not.

When you talk about the failure to provide satisfactory explanations of the "independent variables" (and their connection to the dependent variables or relativised phenomena) do you have particular accounts in mind that you think have failed, or are you unaware of any attempts being made in the first place? I wonder whether a lot of people might be in the second position, and so perhaps that's something we could post about some time... I'll talk to the others and see if someone is interested in writing that!

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Ben
1/26/2017 01:46:13 pm

I am happy to see this blog pop up and comment on this issue. I have firsthand familiarity with the scorn suffered by us poor relativists in the academy, and now we are taking a beating in popular discourse with all the buzz surrounding fake news, alternative facts, etc.

It is frequently assumed that being more rigorously absolutist about Truth and Reason will counteract these phenomena and their underlying causes of political/geographic division, media balkanization, and so on. I think these assumptions are really in need of rebuttal. They ignore that relativists (and their relatives: pluralists, pragmatists, and other wishy-washy folks) have compellingly argued that the Truth is just obstinate certainty - a license to ignore and dehumanize others. Seeing the truth as emerging out of irreducibly social practices of inquiry and justification promotes solidarity, while the correspondence theory of truth, seeing truth as a purely representational relation between the self and a static world, removes this requirement of mutual accountability. I agree with your arguments in this piece: there is a great difference between philosophical relativism and mere dishonesty and opportunism. Relativism, I think, tells us that being Right isn't good enough - that we must be able to publicly articulate and defend our reasons. Simple lying and deception hardly satisfy that requirement

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Natalie Ashton link
1/27/2017 01:06:28 am

Thanks for your comment! I'm glad to hear others agree that there is a need for this kind of discussion. And yes, I think that there are some strange assumptions about relativism out there which I hope we can shed some light on.

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Maggie Roessler
1/27/2017 02:18:15 am

I've just come across another philosophical discussion of this issue on Jonathan Ichikawa's blog:

http://blog.jichikawa.net/2017/01/facts-alternative-facts-and-definitions.html

He cites that same tweet and points out that the definition given by Merriam-Webster is awful - it would be better suited as a definition of *purported* facts. "Truths don't become facts when people present them." His discussion there strikes me as dismissive of metaphysical relativism, as he argues that a basic first step to doing any epistemology or metaphysics is to agree that, "A fact is a part of objective reality."

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Natalie Ashton link
1/29/2017 12:56:37 am

Thanks Maggie - hadn't seen this!

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Machteld Geuskens
1/27/2017 02:43:25 am

Just a question: why is epistemic relativism off the hook, as devil's advocate might ask? It seems to me that Conway can happily argue 'these are not the facts' from the point of view that her community of knowledge rejects what is claimed to be true by the ('unreliable') press as knowledge - so then it is not about truth, or facts (admittedly) but about what are properly regarded facts epistemologically. And then epistemic relativism would bolster her case. Or not? I would like to know..

NB, I do agree that a mention of 'alternative facts' points to a metaphysical stance. But the whole idea that what is presented as true by the press may be somehow legitimately rejected appears to me to be close enough. Her implicated negative view of the press's reliability is necessary for the point to make sense; and so I agree that for consistency, it is strange she even allows them room to have found 'facts'...But even if these remarks may leave epistemological relativism off the hook, the idea that it legitimizes these kinds of moves is something I have yet to find an answer to.

Thank you for responding -- and for this blog!!

PS - could the text of the comments be colored black rather than light grey? That would make reading easier.. :)

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Natalie Ashton link
1/29/2017 01:12:44 am

Hi Machteld, thanks for your comment. Epistemic relativism is the view that justification is relative to epistemic frameworks, or communities, or so on, so an epistemic relativist could argue that the propositions that the press asserted are not justified relative to the Trump administration's framework. But note that they would still need to (a) explain why the Trump administration's framework is a legitimate one, and (b) accept that the those propositions *are* justified relative to other frameworks (like that of the Press), and not "flat-out" false.

I felt that this was important to point out, because some commentators seem to think that the idea of "alternative facts" is something that all relativists would be ok with (and thus that they have to accept the kinds of deeply troubling claims that Conway makes). But there are lots of us who don't like the idea of alternative facts and have principled reasons for disagreeing with Conway!

I hope that answers your question. And I'll look into changing the colour of the comment text (I'd also like to make it bigger, if possible!).

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Rob Tye link
2/25/2017 02:32:34 am

Thanks for launching this initiative and sorry for the late reply

Firstly, I propose to defend the Trump position in a general sort of way, but, please do accept my assurance that this is not intended to defend all of this specific policies!

Firstly Trump and his team are not engaging in philosophy, they are engaging politics, and failure to take that on board might lead to simplistic analysis. I have a great liking for the 18th century intellect, John Arbuthnot, and perhaps his funnies piece of writing is his “History of Political Lies”. Its concluding advice is a general rule of conduct – in politics, a lie must always be answered by a second lie. Readers should judge this for themselves – but my gloss on the underlying logic runs – the initial proponent, by clearly lying, moves the debate into an arena of ‘simple answers and someone to blame’ In that arena, complicated versions of the truth do not cut it, so if the truth is complicated (it usually is) then it will not work. I do not wish to particularly defend this suggestion as the flaws and pitfalls are obvious. I do ask readers to take it seriously, and on objective observation on human behaviour.

Secondly – contra Machteld - I am not playing devils advocate - I do think epistemic relativism is on the hook. Lying for political purposes has been endorsed by philosophers from (at least) Plato to (at least) Collingwood. But the most important one for my current purposes is Keynes’ in his use of the word “guile” in “My Early beliefs”

I know of no good study of the specific relationship between Keynes and Wittgenstein, but all the general biographies point to the extraordinary important position of Keynes in promotion Wittgenstein from 1925, almost as soon as he was dumped by Russell (1922/3). The actually derivation of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein from the early philosophy of Keynes has only received attention, as far as I found, from the economist Carabelli (She agrees it leads on to Feyerabend, Kuhn etc - I asked Carabelli why this line of enquiry was not being followed up, she replied it is “unfashionable”)

Keynes is close the heart/root of the modern intellectual elite, and he himself endorsed guile in politics, and arguably his promotion of Wittgenstein was part and parcel of that ‘guile’. In that connection I ask readers to think about what Wittgenstein said about things like measurement and mathematics, and then switch to Orwell’s ‘newspeak’ in general and what O’Brian specifically asked of Smith in room 101

Enough for now.

Rob Tye

Neil Barton
9/17/2017 11:33:23 pm

Very nice post Natalie (super clear and concise)! Sorry I'm a bit late to the party on this one.

I have almost nothing to say about the specific content of Conway's remarks. However, I would like to ask you a question about the position of metaphysical relativism you outline (it's almost certainly been addressed in the literature, so just point me to the appropriate place if that suits!). The issue is the following:

According to your post, metaphysical relativism is the position that (a) Facts are relative to some variable, and (as you've explained it) (b) The choice of relativisation variable for some phenomena must be explained and justified.

My worry is the following: Either (1.) there's no good standard in which the reasoning for (b) can be carried out, or (2.) what we arrive at is not really metaphysical relativism.

To see where I'm coming from, first assume that there is no objective standard from which to judge (b). Then, the worry will be that any sort of `fact' based discussion will be intractable: How can we communicate with one another (even regarding the choice of variable after an agreement on metaphysical relativism!), if the very content of our position is different depending on our perspective? Whenever I say anything, since there's no objective facts about how one should relativse, it's totally unclear what I've actually said. This strikes me as implausible.

Suppose then that there is an objective standard for judging the choice of relativising variable. Then I don't think you really have metaphysical relativism. You'd rather be a believer in objective truth who thinks that any claims are not semantically transparent and should be interpreted as relating the relevant things and variable. Such a position would be no more (or at least not much more) relativist than saying that the truth value of ``All the pens are blue'' depends on whether or not it's uttered in my office or at home: The two statements just concern a different subject matter.

I suppose one way to respond to this is to say that the judgements of variable choosing are not relative but objective (or come out a single way under every relativisation). This just seems a very unstable position to me: Once you've bought some sort of metaphysical relativism, it seems that the (apparently value-laden) `choice of variable' kind of reasoning is going to be (if anything) a *better* candidate for relativism.

A different way to respond would be to simply to take the first horn of the dilemma, say there is no objective standard for relativising variable choice, but then maintain that communities of thinkers are still able to disagree based on the brute fact that they share enough of a `conceptual framework' (or whatever). Two things to note here:

(i) I used `fact' in trying to formulate the position, so it looks like we've just pushed the problem up another level again.

(ii) Even if we allow a way around (i), it still seems pretty unpalatable to me: We want to say that some people who have horrible fact-forming systems are somehow culpable (even if they produce genuine facts!), and in a way that is also bad on *their* perspective. I shouldn't be able to get away with developing a poor system of navigating the world just by adopting a horrible fact-forming framework.

(Side note: It's very interesting to me that similar issues to the ones here pop up in the foundations of mathematics arena too)

In any case, I enjoyed the post!

Best Wishes,

Neil

Reply
Bobur Murtozaev
11/22/2019 06:49:14 pm

Hi Natalie,
So I think that this new term "alternative facts" is a new tool to protect powerful people when they lie...

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